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Land tenureship may take the form of self-cultivation, contractual workers, leasing 
and partnership. This paper focuses on the last one known as muzara`ah or share-tenancy. 
After clarifying what riba stands for, it reviews the misgiving about share-tenancy as a case 
of riba. It also argues at length in favour of share-tenancy as a legitimate mode of land tenure 
in Shari`ah. Finally, it also draws attention to some reforms to ameliorate the negative aspects 
of share-tenancy arrangements currently in vogue. 
 
Developing countries are predominantly agricultural economies. The main 
contractual relation between owners and tillers of land is not an employer-employee 
but a landlord-tenant bond. Notwithstanding some informal patronage by land-owners, 
the form of compensation is sharecropping in which tenants usually fare poorly. The 
control of landlords over lives of tillers grows through indebtedness of the latter to the 
former. This indebtedness is passed on from generation to generation. Thus practically 
many peasants become serfs. 
Marxism championed the cause of workers over the past one hundred years or 
so. The battle cry was wresting away the ownership of land from landlords, supposedly 
a solution of the problem at its source. Logical consistency necessitated extension of 
the same principle to other sectors of economy, in particular, industry. The experience 
of the Eastern Europe, since the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, has effectively closed 
the chapter on the socialist remedies. 
The exploitation theme in moral and social philosophy is rooted in the widely-
held view that all rewards should be associated with work effort. In the case of riba 
(interest), owners of capital assets claim return without playing any active role in 
productive application of those assets. Thus riba is also treated as synonymous with 
exploitation. Of course, in the Islamic literature this view is also rationalised on the basis 
of interpretation of selected Ayat and A`hadith. Since a share-tenancy arrangement also 
involves a sleeping partner, it is not surprising that some Shari`ah scholars regard the 
share-tenancy arrangement a riba case [Tasin (1988)]. If this were indeed so, the case for 
share-tenancy closes without further ado: it has to be treated as a void contract neither 
negotiable nor enforceable. An immediate implication of this conclusion is narrowing 
the list of options for land cultivation in Muslim countries such as Pakistan.  
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Less attractiveness of investment in farm land, and thereby agriculture in general, would 
be another. These factors call for a systematic review of the subject. Such a study is also 
warranted in view of the debate on riba triggered by the landmark judgement of the 
Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan given in 1991. The issues discussed in this paper may 
gain added significance when the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan starts a review of the said judgement and gives its verdict on it. 
The line of argument in this study is as follows. We first try to settle whether 
one is justified in equating share-tenancy with a riba arrangement, and then go on to 
look at some reforms necessitated by the A`hkam (edicts) on riba and zakah in order to 
eliminate exploitation from the existing land tenure system. The riba appraisal is 
divided into two parts: genesis  of riba (section I) and the status of share-tenancy in this 
regard (section II). It is clarified that riba may lead to exploitation and injustice or zulm 
but zulm per se is not the raison d'être of riba. It is also argued that the edicts on riba 
are irrelevant for the Shari`ah legitimacy of the share-tenancy contract. Our analysis 
also helps us to sharpen the focus on policy measures for reforming production and 
other relations in agriculture (section III). 
 
I.  THE GENESIS OF RIBA 
Riba is traditionally viewed as a predetermined and fixed return claimed by 
lenders on loans while they do not share in the concerns and/or efforts at the borrowers' 
end. Of course, at the time of the prohibition of riba fourteen centuries ago, one finds 
instances of borrowing for trade but loans were mostly sought by those in want and 
dire need. The final Qur’anic decree on riba (al Baqarah 2: 278-281) also states that 
neither creditors do zulm on debtors nor the latter do the same to the former. This has 
tempted many scholars to claim that the rationale behind the prohibition of riba is an 
end to exploitation of the weak and poor [Saeed (1995)]. 
If one reads “landlord”, “tenant” and “land” in place of lender, borrower and the 
object of loan, respectively, in the foregoing description, the similarities tempt one to 
view the reward claimed by absentee landowners in all landlord-tenant arrangements as 
riba. This reward may be in the form of either land rent or a fixed share in crops. The 
former corresponds to a rental agreement and the latter to a share-tenancy contract. This 
paper focuses on share-tenancy arrangements, the dominant mode for landownership 
and cultivation. The case of renting land is also addressed but in passing. 
While earlier jurists questioned share-tenancy arrangements (muzara`ah or 
mokhabarah) on the basis of the A`hadith on the subject, many scholars challenge 
them on grounds that they represent a case of riba. The views of Tasin (1988), as 
mentioned above, and Ziaul Haque (1977) are examples of this thinking. It is, 
therefore, desirable to start the argument with an analysis of what riba stands for and 
what it does not. 
  In the Qur’an, the decrees on riba primarily call for the execution of all loan Riba, Share-tenancy and Agrarian Reforms 
transactions on a one-to-one and equal basis in terms of the units of the thing given and 
taken back [Tahir (1996a)]. This being the case, it is pertinent to form any opinion 
about riba in the light of the nature of a loan transaction. A loan is a legal contract 
between a lender and a borrower. It has three distinguishing features: 
  1.  Both the ownership and usufruct of the object of loan, are transferred to the 
borrower during the pendency of loan. 
  2.  A loan involves exchange, i.e., give and take back, of items of the same kind. 
For example, if rupees were lent, rupees would be taken back. 
  3.  The lender is not a party to use of the object of loan until it remains in the 
possession of the borrower. 
The above points apply to all loans, whether in money or commodity form. The first 
feature signifies what a loan transaction helps to achieve. The second and third features 
are generic properties of a loan transactions. Keeping in view these two properties and 
the basic edict on riba, it may be defined as follows: 
  Riba is a discrepancy which results from the contractual obligations of a 
party in the context of a direct exchange of items of the same general kind 
between two parties. 
  [Tahir (1994, p.3)] 
In our definition, the words “discrepancy”, “contractual obligations” and “direct 
exchange of items of the same general kind” are noteworthy. The notion of “direct 
exchange” stems from homogeneous character of the exchange involved in a loan 
transaction. The emphasis on “direct exchange” and also the idea of “items of the same 
general kind” are best explained in a well-known `Hadith according to which the 
Prophet (SAAWS - _allAllaho `alaihay wasallam) advised Sayyidena Bilal as follows. 
If the latter wanted to trade poor quality dates directly with good quality dates, he ought 
to have exchanged them in equal amount (by measure) while, of course, ignoring the 
qualitative differences between the two types of dates. However, if the said 
arrangement was not practicable, he should have sold poor quality dates for something 
else and buy good quality dates with the sale proceeds, i.e., acquire good quality dates 
on unequal terms but indirectly. 
The idea of “contractual obligations” may be verified by noting that a lender can 
accept something over and above the principal of a loan provided it is given by the 
borrower voluntarily after discharging his debt obligations. 
The concept of “discrepancy” is slightly at variance with the traditional view of 
riba as an excess. While “discrepancy” covers the case of an excess, it also applies to 
such cases in which debtors seek early settlement of debts on concessional terms. That 
is, in principle, Shari`ah recognises the principal of a loan (or, debt in a credit sale) as 
contractual obligation of the indebted party; but while the lender cannot claim an Sayyid Tahir 
excess over and above his principal, the debtor too cannot claim a reduction while 
retiring it. Last but not least, it can be said that the above definition also covers other 
types of “discrepancy” as well, including that due to time factor. 
The above definition also implies some adjunct guidelines for transactions. This 
point may be seen as follows. While the lender in a loan transaction is restricted to his 
principal, practically he is called upon to concede his lending costs, the costs in terms 
of income foregone and loan recovery costs. If these costs are taken into account, the 
Qur’anic prohibition of riba may be seen to contain two auxiliary decrees for those who 
choose to enter into a loan transaction [Tahir (1995), pp.5-6]. 
  (a)  The lender must concede his lending costs. 
  (b)  The qualitative differences between the sum lent and that taken back must be 
conceded. 
These points can be generalised to see that the edicts on riba in `Hadith bring the 
trading practices into line with the Qur’anic A`hkam. A modern-day equivalent of such 
cases is trading of new currency notes for old ones by money changers, for example. 
The said A`hadith also imply, for example, that exchange of old jewellery for new by a 
jeweller must be without the latter applying a cut. To sum up, the edicts on riba 
regulate lending as well as all other exchanges that are generically comparable to loan 
transactions. 
Before we appraise share-tenancy from the riba angle, it is also worthwhile to 
see if there is any link between riba and exploitation or not. More specifically, we 
would like to establish whether or not "exploitation" is an overriding consideration in 
order to determine the existence of riba. The relevant questions in this regard are as 
follows. (1) Does the prohibition of riba have a moral and ethical context, namely an 
end to exploitation? (2) Can one interpret the last Qur’anic decree on riba to conclude 
that indeed the aim of the prohibition of is an end to exploitation of the poor and the 
needy? While detailed argument on these issues is available elsewhere [Tahir (1996a)], 
a few directly relevant points are as follows. 
No doubt Islam places the greatest emphasis on moral ethos of an Islamic 
economy, nevertheless the prohibition of riba is a part of the parameters set by Allah 
(SWT - Sub`hanahu wa Ta`aala) for this life as a test for man. Its status is like that of 
salah (prayer), saum (fasting), zakah (a religious levy) and `hajj (pilgrimage), for 
example. Each of these is beneficial for mankind. But the A`hkam of Allah SWT are 
primarily based on His Discretion, not the welfare of mankind. 
As mentioned earlier, the end-of-exploitation rationale behind the prohibition of 
riba is often traced to al Baqarah 2:279. This Ayah is part of the text al Baqarah 
2:278-281 revealed sometime in 9 or 10 A.H. (After Hijrah). While the then lenders 
were restricted to their principals in al Baqarah 2:279, both the lenders and the 
borrowers were directed to avoid zulm. According to Shari`ah, zulm occurs when any Riba, Share-tenancy and Agrarian Reforms 
party to a transaction is denied its rights recognised by Shari`ah. Thus when in 9 or 10 
A.H. both the creditors and their debtors were called upon to avoid zulm, it only meant 
adherence to the edicts in force at that time. Those A`k_m are undoubtedly in Aale 
`Imran 3:130 and al Baqarah 2:275 which read as follows. 
O Believers! Don't eat riba on top of riba
1 And be afraid of Allah so 
that you may be successful. (Aale `Imran 3:130) 
Riba-eaters will get up on the Day of Judgement like a person driven to 
madness by the Shaitaan (Devil) with his evil touch. This will happen 
because of their claim that (profit on) bay` or trading is the same as 
riba whereas Allah has permitted bay` but prohibited riba. 
As to riba charged in the past, whoever received the advice from 
his Rabb (as per Aale `Imran 3:130), his matter is with Allah. That 
subject should be treated as closed in this world. However, all those 
who continue to charge riba in lieu of the outstanding debts, they 
belong to Jahannam (Hell) where they will stay for good. (al Baqarah 
2:275) 
 
The first Ayah decreed in late 3 A.H. that the believers ought to avoid riba. The second 
Ayah, revealed soon after the first, clarified that the then existing riba-based contracts 
were to be honoured after deleting the riba clauses in them. On both occasions, the 
A`k_m are without the so-called `no zulm' proviso or its equivalent. 
That attributing the end-of-exploitation rationale to the prohibition of riba is 
unwarranted may also be seen as follows. First, like all other exchanges, loan 
transactions are voluntary. The A`hkam on riba simply state how a person is required to 
act if he chooses to enter into the framework of loan transactions. Second, as noted 
above, lenders are invariably exposed to many costs. In other words, if indeed end-of-
exploitation were the rationale behind the prohibition of riba, then lenders would have 
been allowed some sort of compensation in the framework of loans as in other 
transactions. Finally, as noted earlier, loans are essentially a legal contract which 
involves temporary transfer of property rights, ownership and usufruct, from one party 
to another; the A`hkam of riba just signify the terms for executing such exchanges and 
nothing more. In this background, we can now review the status of the share-tenancy 
arrangement from the point of view of riba. 
 
II. RIBA AND SHARE-TENANCY 
According to Tasin (1988, pp.76-8), the matter of muzara`ah or share-tenancy is 
1The literal translation would be: “Don’t feast on riba—doubled and quadrupled.” In either case, the 
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quite similar to that of riba on account of its nature and implications. Thus, in his view, 
the Qur’anic decrees on riba apply to muzara`ah as well. To support his point of view, 
he cites the A`hadith of Jabir Ibn Abdullah in al Mustadrak of Imam `Hakim, Raf`ay 
Ibn Khudaij in Sunnan Abu Dawood and Miswar Ibn Makhramah in Mo'jamm al Aoust 
of Imam Tibrani. He also draws support for his view from commentaries on the Qur'an 
by Ibn Katheer and Qurtubi, two great exegetes of all time. While we look into likely 
explanations of the aforementioned A`hadith later on, it is pertinent to start the 
argument on the following note. 
According to a `Hadith of Fudalah Ibn `Obaid reported in both Sahih Muslim 
and Sunan Abu Dawood, the Muslims were trading an ouqiyyah, a weight measure, of 
gold for two or three dinars, pure gold coins, with the Jews after the conquest of 
Khyber. The Prophet (SAAWS) directed them to carry out the said exchanges on the 
basis of equality in terms of weight. Several A`hadith on riba confirm that the practice 
in question was in conflict with the A`hkam on riba and, therefore, corrected by the 
Prophet (SAAWS). This `Hadith makes it abundantly clear that riba dealings with the 
Jews were non-permissible at the time. This point is important for correctly appraising 
the land cultivation arrangement made with the Jews about the lands of Khyber.
2 With 
the conquest of Khyber, its lands became property of the Muslims. The Prophet 
(SAAWS) permitted the Jews to till those lands on the condition that the crops and fruits 
would be shared with the Muslims on a 50:50 basis, a share-tenancy arrangement for 
all practical purposes. Given the forbiddance of riba dealings with the Jews, had the 
said tenancy arrangement been a case of riba, there was no question of the Prophet 
(SAAWS) sanctioning it. In other words, treating share-tenancy as a riba-based 
transaction is putting the argument on a wrong footing. In fact, edicts on riba are not 
relevant for Shari`ah appraisal of share-tenancy. 
All transactions may be seen as controlling ownership rights and/or access to 
usufruct of the object(s) of exchange. For example, trading represents a case of 
irrevocable reciprocal exchange of all property rights, both ownership and usufruct, 
between the trading parties. Leasing is a case in which ownership is not transferred but 
only usufruct rights go to the lessee, and those too for the duration of contract. In this 
perspective, share-tenancy represents an arrangement whereby ownership rights and 
usufruct of land are not transferred but shared with another party for the duration of 
contract. On the other hand, as explained above, riba arises when property rights of an 
asset are fully transferred from the owner to another party during the pendency of 
contract. Thus there is no point in appraising share-tenancy on riba grounds. 
If the riba factor is not relevant, then, apart from the issue of exploitation of 
tenants to which we shall return later on, is there anything fundamentally wrong with 
the share-tenancy contract? No. It addresses genuine needs and concerns of landowners 
2The details on this subject may be found in Usmani (1413 A.H., pp.171-72).Riba, Share-tenancy and Agrarian Reforms 
when they may not be able to till the land themselves and they may also not have a 
recourse to an alternative arrangement. For example, hiring and managing workers may 
be difficult, and renting land too may be infeasible. Its relevance can be seen in two 
simple examples. A minor or a widow may inherit a piece of land which may be their 
sole asset. Obviously they may not be able to manage “their” lands themselves. Does 
Shari`ah close all options for them to benefit from their assets? Likewise, imagine a 
landowner going for `hajj several centuries ago. The travel to Makkah and back home 
required good part of a year or even more in the case of far-off places. Was this person 
to leave his land fallow? Given that the Qur’an permits pilgrims to seek economic 
bounties on the way to `hajj (al Baqarah 2:198), is he denied the chance to make a 
gainful arrangement in respect of land left behind? These are just two instances to 
establish that in principle there is nothing wrong with the share-tenancy contract as 
such. It is a perfectly legal contract provided, of course, that the stipulated conditions 
meet all relevant Shari`ah rules. 
The available contracts against which one can put share-tenancy and derive the 
necessary A`hkam may be either renting/leasing (ijarah) or partnership (modarabah or 
musharakah). As mentioned above, in a leasing contract only usufruct is transferred; 
the ownership is neither transferred nor shared. This leaves us with the option of 
viewing share-tenancy as a partnership. Two possibilities in this regard are as follows. 
  (a)  If the arrangement involves the landowner providing land, seeds, tools and 
other inputs and the tenant just his labour, this would be the pure case of 
modarabah. 
  (b)  If the contract is such that the tenant assumes the responsibility for arranging 
seeds, tools and some other inputs, this would be musharakah, of course, with 
zero effort on part of the landowner. The quantum of landowner's effort in 
actual farming is not critical for the nature of contract because there is no 
Shari`ah constraint of minimum effort by a partner to be met. 
Of course, one can imagine another case, still a musharakah, in which the tenant may 
have his own implements but provision of fungible inputs (such as seeds and fertilisers) 
may be responsibility of the landowner. Given that all material losses in a partnership 
are to be shared in proportion to a party’s capital and that there is little or no chance of 
loss in land per se, perhaps this arrangement would be more in line with not only the 
letter but also the spirit of Shari`ah. 
The degree of responsibility and thereby costs incurred by both a landlord and 
his tenant are to be reflected in crop sharing arrangements. The principal Shari`ah 
requirement in this regard is that the crop-sharing ratio must be specified before both 
parties enter into their contractual obligations. If the contract were for one crop, the 
settlement at harvest time is to be as follows. First, ushr (zakah on agricultural produce) 
has to be deducted. Next, the capital is to be returned. That is, land is to revert to the Sayyid Tahir 
landlord, implements to their respective owners and costs of fungible inputs to whoever 
happens to be responsible for them in the first place. And, finally, any remaining 
produce is to be distributed in the pre-agreed ratios. If the contract is for one year or 
more, accounting for fixed capital assets (land and implements) may be deferred till the 
end of the contract. 
The above arrangements are fairly simple and straightforward. Where are then 
the seeds of malpractice in a share-tenancy arrangement? While lack of institutions to 
protect the poor and mostly illiterate tenants can be held responsible for the unfortunate 
status quo in developing countries, in our opinion, the root cause of the initiation and 
perpetuation of all this is rural indebtedness. The tenants often require economic 
support to meet their personal needs between two crops. Here lies the primary source of 
widespread dissatisfaction with share-tenancy. 
The question that needs to be first answered is: can there be a debt contract 
between a landlords and his tenant in addition to a share-tenancy agreement. The 
answer from Shari`ah point of view is "yes". What needs to be ensured is that riba does 
not enter into this contract. While claiming an excess over and above the principal 
would be outright riba, there may be hidden riba in the form of landlords benefiting 
from services of their tenants at no or low costs. According to several A`hadith, 
creditors are called upon to avoid drawing any benefits from their debtors.
3 It is not 
difficult to see that many existing problems may be traced to non-compliance with 
Shari`ah in general rather than the share-cropping contract. 
Notwithstanding the above points, in passing, it is useful to answer some general 
objections on the Shari`ah legitimacy of muzara`ah or mukhabarah and also kiraa' 
(renting agricultural land). The A`hadith on these subjects are attributed to the 
following Companions of the Prophet (SAAWS): Jabir Ibn Abdullah, Zaid Ibn Thabit, 
Abi Horairah, Ummul Mo'mineen Sayyidah `Aaishah, Sayyidena Ali, Sa’d Ibn 
Waqqas, Abdullah Ibn `Omar, Abdullah Ibn `Abbas, Osayd Ibn Zohair and Raf`ay Ibn 
Khudaij. Their narrations are reported in all classical works on `Hadith. Tasin (1988, 
pp.83-133) also draws on the same sources. His approach to interpretation is to treat the 
prohibition stated in `Hadith texts as primary and to reject any permission implied by 
the texts in favour of the prohibition. Without going into the details of Tasin's 
argument, one may also look at the matter as follows. 
Some general conclusions that may be drawn from the immediate texts of the 
various A`hadith are as follows: 
  (1)  If someone has agricultural land, he should either cultivate it himself, give it 
to another Muslim for cultivation at no charge or leave the land fallow. 
  (2)  While some A`hadith directly mention that agricultural land should not be 
3Usually such A`hadith are treated as a part of moral teachings of Islam. But there is no bar on 
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rented, some others restrict the prohibition to renting for a fraction of the 
produce, and yet some others allow its leasing against gold and silver. 
  (3)  A share-cropping is either condemned or prohibited. 
However, if one puts together the texts of all A`hadith together, the following points 
also reveal themselves. When the Prophet (SAAWS) prohibited share-cropping, it 
referred to the following arrangement. Either the landlord gave his land to a tenant on 
the basis of a fixed quantity of grain or he reserved for himself a part of land whose 
produce went to him while harvest from the rest belonged to the tenant. It is not too 
difficult to see the problems with such arrangements. While the principle was that, in 
view of the nature of share-tenancy contract, the landowner might claim a fraction of 
the produce, the return to him in the form of a fixed quantity of the harvest or from a 
fixed tract of land could exceed what might be due to him under a regular crop-sharing 
arranging: the difference between “recognised” right and “realised” right had the 
semblance of riba. This seems to explain the reasons for the prohibition of muzara`ah 
as per the A`hadith under reference. Incidentally, this also seems to be the explanation 
for the permissibility of renting land for gold or silver but not the land produce. 
That, according to some A`hadith, a landowner could keep the land unused also 
signifies something. This option effectively meant that a prospective tenant could be 
denied a means of earning. Given this extreme possibility, it is difficult to see how 
share-tenancy was to be outrightly unlawful even though it was a potential medium for 
increasing income earning possibilities for the poor. 
As discussed above, muzara`ah is akin to modarabah. Of course, one may ask: 
what kind of modarabah is this in which the owner of capital (land) is not exposed to 
any loss? This question may be answered in three ways. First, it is not necessary that 
the provider of capital assets in modarabah must be exposed to a loss. That is, what is 
critical is the legal aspect(s) of the exchange involved. And, there is no problem with 
share-tenancy on this count. Second, land is also exposed to some depreciation. There 
are also examples of erosion of land through land slides in hilly areas and washing 
away of tracts of land in river deltas. These possibilities imply that the likelihood of 
material loss to the landlord is not entirely ruled out under all circumstances. Third, the 
nature of contract may be suitably modified to bring it into line with not only the letter 
but also spirit of an ordinary modarabah. For example, as noted above, this may be 
done by requiring landlords to bear the costs of fungible inputs, such as seed, fertiliser 
and water. 
Objection against muzara`ah can be answered in another way too. Can a 
landlord hire the services of his tenant on a wage basis? The answer is obviously yes. If 
he can, then another question arises. Given that there is no Shari`ah limit on minimum 
wage [Tahir (1994)], is it not possible that the tenant may be materially as well of or as 
worse off as he might be under muzara`ah? The ordinary wage contract is infeasible in  
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agriculture, apart from some seasonal jobs, because the time involved in sowing and 
harvesting the crop is very long and workers may not wait for payment of wages. 
Moreover, one or both of the following two things may also happen. Either the workers 
would be unemployed due to seasonal nature of employment or they would be forced 
into accepting low wages. In other words, economically workers may come to the same 
point as in the case of a share-tenancy contract. Given these points, it is difficult to see 
why  muzara`ah should be singled out as prohibited but not ijarah, the wage 
arrangement? 
Given that Islam provides maximum leeway for land tenureship, including 
share-tenancy, we may now turn to malpractices in agriculture and their Shari`ah 
remedy. 
 
III.  AGRARIAN REFORMS 
The existing plight of tenants in Pakistan and other predominantly agricultural 
economies is truly despicable. Every now and then, there are calls for putting limits on 
land holdings and even outright nationalisation of land along with its free distribution 
among peasants. But these surgical cures are at best stop-gap measures. The problem is 
bound to resurface if it is not addressed at its source, namely (1) the contractual 
relations between landowners and tenants, (2) the weak bargaining position of tenants 
and (3) intergenerational transfer of debts. Piecemeal solutions are unlikely to give the 
desired results. What is needed, in the end, is to address all three factors at the same 
time and also to take additional remedial measures such as zakah and ushr reforms. 
The most important component of the environment for share-tenancy contracts 
is the general legal framework in which landowners and tenants operate. Key elements 
of a share-tenancy contract are (a) the extent of input contributions by landowners and 
tenants and (b) the crop-sharing ratio. As mentioned earlier, the provision of fungible 
inputs may be made the responsibility of landowners. Such parameters for contracts 
may be prescribed by the state as part of regulating the environment for negotiating 
contracts. However, no hard and fast rules can be mandated in respect of crop-sharing 
ratios, because that would infringe upon the rate at which landowners may agree to 
share their property rights. This point stems from the famous `Hadith about price 
controls according to which the owner of a thing cannot be denied his desired 
compensation for parting with it. Of course, any lacuna in this regard can be addressed 
through strengthening the bargaining position of tenants. 
The bargaining power of tenants can be increased by taking steps (1) to make 
tenants fully know their rights, (2) to make wider occupational choices available to 
them, (3) to take care of their short-term personal needs and (4) to give tenants legal 
protection in favourably seeking any contractual rights. Education and training hold the 
key in the first and second respects. Knowledge and skills would give the tenants and 
their children a fair chance to escape the traps set up by landlords. Obviously what Riba, Share-tenancy and Agrarian Reforms 
matters in this respect is Shari`ah education along with general education and training 
in skills which would make occupational shifts possible. While the creditors may have 
the first claim on the income and assets of debtors (over and above their basic needs), 
they cannot restrict occupational choices by and mobility of the debtors. 
Landlords get a leverage on the lives of their tenants through debt, especially 
that which transfers from one generation to the next. Thus, any strategy for improving 
the lot of tenants must give a pivotal role to eradication of rural indebtedness. Tenants 
are bound to make a recourse to borrowing because of the time lag between productive 
efforts and their results. Three points are noteworthy in this respect. Firstly, tenants 
may borrow from their landlords. That is, there is no Shari`ah problem in combining a 
debt contract with a sharing contract between two parties. But the general A`hkam of 
riba and principles for settling debts have to be observed. Secondly, as mentioned 
earlier, in principle, creditors cannot seek any benefits from tenants beyond those 
stipulated in the share-tenancy contract governing the tilling of land. This applies to all 
petty services and other productive work that landlords take from their tenants at 
present. The problem may be solved, albeit partially, by requiring the landowners to 
separately compensate the tenants for such work. Thirdly, the debts of fathers or 
forefathers cannot be transferred to the next generation: the claims of creditors are 
restricted at best to the assets left behind by the deceased. The necessary action in these 
respects is obvious. What is needed is some fresh legislation and enforcement of the 
same. 
It is also possible to address the problem of rural indebtedness through proper 
enforcement of the Islamic system of zakah and ushr. In principle, ushr is to be 
deducted from the produce at harvest time. Thus, the initial incidence of zakah would 
be on both parties to a share-cropping arrangement, namely landlord and tenant. 
However, after zakah is separated and both landlord and tenant(s) get their respective 
shares, the first claim on zakah may be given to the immediate ghaarimeen, the 
indebted tenants. This would be perfectly legitimate on the analogy of a wife giving her 
zakah to her zakah-worthy husband. Zakah proceeds handled in this way can go a long 
way toward clearing the debts of tenants to their landlords. Of course, necessary 
Shari`ah parameters for such a scheme need to be worked out. 
 
IV.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Muzara`ah or share-tenancy is a legal arrangement in Shari`ah. It covers the 
case involving sharing of both ownership and usufruct of land, principal asset in 
agriculture, during the pendency of the contract between landowners and tenants. What 
matters in this regard is observance of Shari`ah requirements for such a contract, of 
course, in a Shari`ah-consistent environment in which tenants can "safely" claim their 
rights. Widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo is understandable. But the 
problems can be solved only through providing a proper institutional framework with Sayyid Tahir 
enhanced bargaining power for workers. The existing political and legal system does 
not have the capacity to bring about any meaningful change because the ruling landed 
èlite is not willing to forsake its un-Islamic and, of course, unjustified privileges. The 
only foreseeable solution is enforcement of Shari`ah, albeit Islamisation of agriculture, 
where basic parameters for contracts are all exogenously set. 
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